I don’t think you give the “lay public” enough credit when you say that they treat a theorist’s axioms as, let’s say, reliable algorithms for predicting actual foreign policy action (or inaction). Thoughtful people know directly from their own knowledge and memory of history that state actions (“foreign policy”) rarely obey simple, linear paths. In fact, of all systems in which human agency plays a significant role, foreign policy might be the single area least amenable to reductionist formulas. Said more simply, any serious person can see that no formula for explaining or predicting foreign policy “works.” I really don’t think a person needs to be a scholar to know this, and I have to challenge the suggestion that only people who have done scholarly work grasp the difficulty.
The great benefit of using explanatory schemes like Mearsheim’s five principles - for laypeople like me - is that they suggest useful questions to ask and they interrupt the bland and somewhat unconscious acceptance of oversimplified propaganda. The fact that some people adopt these high level abstractions uncritically or dogmatically is a failure of the adoptees, not the IR theory.
I realize most people are not seriously interested in the frustrating, unsatisfying and never ending pursuit of the truth. They want answers, villains, heroes, victims, and simple causal propositions with which they can identify. The value of a theorist like Mearsheim is not that he explains; it’s that he provokes important and useful questions. The lay person - noticing that even the scholars often cannot seem to settle on a unified description of historical phenomena - is well served by the work of a man like Mearsheim who, in effect, forces a confrontation with the opinion of the crowd. I find some of his propositions persuasive, some preposterous, but almost all thought provoking in the best sense.
P.S. Thanks for posting this essay. I learned a lot, and I look forward to finishing the linked 2016 article on U.S. - Russian interpretations of the negotiations that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union. I have been wanting to read a sober review of this subject and I think you lead me to it.
I don’t think the problem is that people are internalizing the wrong IR theories and using them for foreign policy analysis—I don’t think they’re internalizing theories at all.
I think the problem is that they listen to academics who have authority in one domain (IR) and think that makes them qualified to talk about something with a totally different analytical skill set (foreign policy).
Re: Mearsheimer, I think it’s great when laymen study offensive realism, and I’m not criticizing him as a scholar. They just shouldn’t think his theory can answer granular level foreign policy questions.
When I have read his works, I immediately thought of Machiavelli, and I wonder whether his work is influential for emotional reasons. When a highly intellectual person denies that common moral rules are in some sense or circumstances not relevant (Machiavelli, Mosca, Pareto, Nietzsche, Ayn Rand), it feels "badass". It feels like a breath of fresh air, because, truth be told, morality matters, but 90% of morality is posturing, signalling and bullshitting. We definitely want to keep the 10% that is real, but someone just blowing that 90% away is refreshing.
I always think that Tetlock's work on superforecasters is of extreme importance to thinking about how to make the best possible guesses about future political events. Superforecasters can be described, among other things, as being foxes rather than hedgehogs. It is clear that Mearsheimer would rather fall in the 'hedgehog' category (as would most of his colleagues trying to devise general theories - in itself a useful activity if not misinterpreted as providing a tool for reliably predicting concrete events. Actually pointed out by the author of this piece). It is interesting that superforecasters, even though being much better forecasters than others, still are not THAT far better than chance - thus though in fact being much better at forecasting than the typical self-confident expert is, are still not meeting the standards experts pretend to meet. Typically being modest, they would not expect to be right even 'three times out of four'. And even their modest, but very real, success diminishes quickly as the events they are forecasting lie further in the future - with, if I remember correctly, six months typically being the point at which even their forecasts become little better than chance.
I really appreciate the fact that criticism of Mearsheimer's theory here goes hand in hand with lauding his excellent qualities as a person and academic.
I don’t think you give the “lay public” enough credit when you say that they treat a theorist’s axioms as, let’s say, reliable algorithms for predicting actual foreign policy action (or inaction). Thoughtful people know directly from their own knowledge and memory of history that state actions (“foreign policy”) rarely obey simple, linear paths. In fact, of all systems in which human agency plays a significant role, foreign policy might be the single area least amenable to reductionist formulas. Said more simply, any serious person can see that no formula for explaining or predicting foreign policy “works.” I really don’t think a person needs to be a scholar to know this, and I have to challenge the suggestion that only people who have done scholarly work grasp the difficulty.
The great benefit of using explanatory schemes like Mearsheim’s five principles - for laypeople like me - is that they suggest useful questions to ask and they interrupt the bland and somewhat unconscious acceptance of oversimplified propaganda. The fact that some people adopt these high level abstractions uncritically or dogmatically is a failure of the adoptees, not the IR theory.
I realize most people are not seriously interested in the frustrating, unsatisfying and never ending pursuit of the truth. They want answers, villains, heroes, victims, and simple causal propositions with which they can identify. The value of a theorist like Mearsheim is not that he explains; it’s that he provokes important and useful questions. The lay person - noticing that even the scholars often cannot seem to settle on a unified description of historical phenomena - is well served by the work of a man like Mearsheim who, in effect, forces a confrontation with the opinion of the crowd. I find some of his propositions persuasive, some preposterous, but almost all thought provoking in the best sense.
P.S. Thanks for posting this essay. I learned a lot, and I look forward to finishing the linked 2016 article on U.S. - Russian interpretations of the negotiations that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union. I have been wanting to read a sober review of this subject and I think you lead me to it.
I don’t think the problem is that people are internalizing the wrong IR theories and using them for foreign policy analysis—I don’t think they’re internalizing theories at all.
I think the problem is that they listen to academics who have authority in one domain (IR) and think that makes them qualified to talk about something with a totally different analytical skill set (foreign policy).
Re: Mearsheimer, I think it’s great when laymen study offensive realism, and I’m not criticizing him as a scholar. They just shouldn’t think his theory can answer granular level foreign policy questions.
Who was #2 on the list of humblest celebrities?
Dennis Kucinich (I’ve only met two celebrities)
Oh oops I thought you said Mearsheimer was #3
When I have read his works, I immediately thought of Machiavelli, and I wonder whether his work is influential for emotional reasons. When a highly intellectual person denies that common moral rules are in some sense or circumstances not relevant (Machiavelli, Mosca, Pareto, Nietzsche, Ayn Rand), it feels "badass". It feels like a breath of fresh air, because, truth be told, morality matters, but 90% of morality is posturing, signalling and bullshitting. We definitely want to keep the 10% that is real, but someone just blowing that 90% away is refreshing.
I always think that Tetlock's work on superforecasters is of extreme importance to thinking about how to make the best possible guesses about future political events. Superforecasters can be described, among other things, as being foxes rather than hedgehogs. It is clear that Mearsheimer would rather fall in the 'hedgehog' category (as would most of his colleagues trying to devise general theories - in itself a useful activity if not misinterpreted as providing a tool for reliably predicting concrete events. Actually pointed out by the author of this piece). It is interesting that superforecasters, even though being much better forecasters than others, still are not THAT far better than chance - thus though in fact being much better at forecasting than the typical self-confident expert is, are still not meeting the standards experts pretend to meet. Typically being modest, they would not expect to be right even 'three times out of four'. And even their modest, but very real, success diminishes quickly as the events they are forecasting lie further in the future - with, if I remember correctly, six months typically being the point at which even their forecasts become little better than chance.
I really appreciate the fact that criticism of Mearsheimer's theory here goes hand in hand with lauding his excellent qualities as a person and academic.