"There is merit to the idea that the war in Ukraine is a security dilemma and Putin believed he had to invade to prevent NATO from using its forces there to threaten Russia’s security. Putin has actually maintained his legitimacy in Russia by cultivating a reputation as a restrainer toward the West, so domestic explanations for the war don’t make a lot of sense. And for all the histrionics in the media and Eastern European capitals about the restoration of the old Russian Empire, it’s difficult to come by any reliable evidence that Putin imagines himself going any further than Ukraine."
Putin does not imagine himself going any further that Ukraine right now because he got a rude awakening regarding the efficiency of his military. But I put the likelihood quite high indeed that he would gladly gobble up Moldova too. Especially if we had just let him regime change Ukraine to his heart desires.
I also think it's quite probable that Putin would really like to restore the old Russian Empire, by how he speaks about it. He might think about it as some long term objective of Russia.
Other than posturing as ""a restrainer toward the West" Putin has also maintained his legitimacy in Russia by being a dictator that controls information and murders or imprisons people that step out of line too much.
Additionally, I reject the idea that a state's concerns over a defensive alliance justify invading its neighbors. As you rightly pointed out, Russia is an aggressive nation that wages war on its neighbors, like Georgia. In any case Russia has NATO at its borders right now and in this moment of great tension we have never used Finland to threaten Russia's security. It's also telling how Russia's neighboring countries beg the west to join NATO—not because of some imagined threat, but because they have genuine security concerns.
Obviously I like hearing your perspective though and on China I think you have a valid point.
I’m sure you understand the difference between explanation and justification. That Putin is a restrainer by Russian standards — if you think it’s just “posturing,” read the linked paper — tells us there was probably a perceived threat to Russian security and not just imperial machinations. Whether he’s a dictator is a non sequitur. It’s also not relevant whether NATO is actually a defensive alliance, just whether Russia sees it that way. After it promised not to expand “one inch eastward” past East Germany, but did anyway; bombed Serbia without UNSC authorization; exceeded its mandate and overthrew Gaddafi; and kept talking about “democracy promotion” (interpreted as regime change against non-democracies) and deploying more and more military assets to Eastern Europe, you might see why Moscow wouldn’t see it as so benign.
Using normative language like merit implies a level of justification rather than simply explaining the mental state of Russian leaders. That said, discussing the merits of Russia’s concerns is valid—there's no issue in doing so. We should do this.
Regarding the paper you linked, I don't disagree with its abstract that "Putin wins as much support when he is prudent and cooperative as when he is hostile and aggressive. These findings add to evidence that Russia's full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine was not a war of domestic political necessity." However, domestic popularity is only one factor in Putin’s decision-making. He likely believed the war would be easy peasy and a good strategic geopolitical move to strengthen Russia.
I mention Putin’s status as a dictator to remind readers that he "maintained his legitimacy" not just through public support but also by silencing and eliminating dissent. Any analysis of Putin’s legitimacy should acknowledge that in Russia, legitimacy is not freely expressed—it begins from a compromised position.
For explanatory purposes, I agree that whether NATO is actually a defensive alliance is not relevant (I acknowledge there is ambiguity). What matters is whether Russian leaders genuinely believe NATO poses a threat or if they merely use this narrative to justify their actions. After two years of Finland being a NATO member, there's little indication that we are actively threatening Russia from there. I doubt Putin perceives NATO as an imminent offensive threat to Russia to the extent that he claims.
From a normative standpoint, one should weigh what is best for the world and for Ukrainians: NATO expansion into Ukraine or Russian expansion into Ukraine. To me, the answer is quite one-sided.
Merit refers to the quality of the explanation, i.e., whether it's accurate. I think this should be obvious.
The question is: Does Russia have revisionist aims toward Eastern Europe, and specifically toward Poland? My position is that this is unclear or unlikely, and even if it does, it doesn't have the capabilities to act on them. It seems like the first part is the only point of disagreement.
Russia's regime type isn't relevant here. There are plenty of revisionist democracies (see: America, United States of) and relatively status quo autocracies (China). So the question becomes: Did Russia perceive NATO as a threat to its security?
I think it's fair to say so. They had plenty of reasons -- the U.S. going back on its word not to expand the alliance past East Germany, the illegal intervention in Kosovo, the overthrow of Gaddafi, military exercises along the border, refusing to close the door on Ukrainian NATO membership in late 2021. And Russia was seeking good relations with the West until around 2008, when NATO vowed that Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become members. The Finland example doesn't tell us anything because (1) Finland joined after the invasion of Ukraine, so it wouldn't have any bearing on why Russia invaded, and (2) what matters is Russia's perception, not reality.
Noah Smith strikes me as someone who is very smart in one narrow domain (economics), and used that to win a big platform, which then pressured/allowed him to pontificate on other subjects on which he is considerably less insightful. Ruy Teixeira is the same way. I like them both but their foreign policy takes are almost always bad. One perk of legacy media is that it would have mostly kept them in their lane.
Even if Japan, South Korea, and Poland did face a high risk of invasion by China/Russia, this wouldn't neccessarily justify nuclear proliferation right? We can think that yes, they face a risk, and yes, nukes would reduce it but that it still doesn't justify an increase in the risk of the use of nuclear weapons.
I'm curious whether this is your view Glenn, or whether you think whether it makes sense for these countries to acquire nukes is contingent on the risk of conventional war that they face? (If it's not contingent on this, why does the risk they face requite any discussion at all?)
There are probably some cases where proliferation is justified because it reduces long term nuclear risk. Probably it would have to be a state (A) with a nuclear armed adversary (B) where B is conventionally weaker and so would have to resort to a nuclear attack to destroy A. I suppose that would mean Japanese or Polish proliferation is bad in any scenario. But there might be a case for South Korea proliferating if North Korea (not China) became a lot more aggressive (or Iran vis a vis Israel for that matter).
Why Japan but not Taiwan? Why Poland but not Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania?
It seems like he’s picking nations that are sitting comfortably behind a couple of other US allies first on the chopping block if the “enemy” decides to invade.
Considering Russia has struggled for years invading a non-NATO nation with a GDP per capita less than $5,000, I don’t think anyone can claim Russia has the capability of invading NATO anytime soon. Their declining demographics (fewer military aged men) make this power imbalance even worse the longer they wait.
South Korea is the only nation here I could see as possibly being a candidate if you really stretch credulity. Obviously there would be many negative 2nd order effects from allowing them to acquire nuclear weapons, but their Northern nuclear neighbor definitely poses the most legitimate concern compared to the other nuclear candidates mentioned.
North Korea is constitutionally obligated to seek reunification, and their relative military strength vs. the South is likely to increase in the future. Uncertainty about US commitment to SK’s defense + rapidly declining military aged men (perhaps 1/3 as many in 2050) means the plausibility of invasion by the North will only go up over time. Maybe a nuclear armed South would serve to discourage this, and this might outweigh the other negatives.
I always find it amusing that so many hawks depict the "axis of autocracies" on a map with China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran highlighted then label Vietnam an emerging US ally even though its relations with China and Russia are closer than its relations with the US and its government is just as autocratic
All of this is simply a-historical: expansionism was the almost universal norm before the XXth century. Only democracy is naturally non expansionist, because fiscal resources come earmarked with electoral liabilities.
Nuclear weapons themselves are an asymmetric defense. The French and British stockpiles were meant as such if the Soviets invaded.
If Japan, SK, and Poland did acquire their own stockpiles, I doubt they would ever see significant use. Noah Smith imagines a fanciful ground war that won't occur in those countries. If China wants a war to dismantle the US led global order it will be in the form of a naval breakout where ICBMs will (hopefully) not see a significant role. Taiwan will either surrender from a blockade or not at all, there won't be any amphibious invasions. Russia will not be interested in invading Poland, but rather in forming a coalition of interested European nations to put financial pressure on them.
Regarding a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, I think you're right that it's unlikely, mostly because it would be really costly and painful for China and could threaten the CCP's legitimacy if it didn't go well. I think you risk employing the generalized anti-caution argument: https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/against-the-generalized-anti-caution
"There is merit to the idea that the war in Ukraine is a security dilemma and Putin believed he had to invade to prevent NATO from using its forces there to threaten Russia’s security. Putin has actually maintained his legitimacy in Russia by cultivating a reputation as a restrainer toward the West, so domestic explanations for the war don’t make a lot of sense. And for all the histrionics in the media and Eastern European capitals about the restoration of the old Russian Empire, it’s difficult to come by any reliable evidence that Putin imagines himself going any further than Ukraine."
Putin does not imagine himself going any further that Ukraine right now because he got a rude awakening regarding the efficiency of his military. But I put the likelihood quite high indeed that he would gladly gobble up Moldova too. Especially if we had just let him regime change Ukraine to his heart desires.
I also think it's quite probable that Putin would really like to restore the old Russian Empire, by how he speaks about it. He might think about it as some long term objective of Russia.
Other than posturing as ""a restrainer toward the West" Putin has also maintained his legitimacy in Russia by being a dictator that controls information and murders or imprisons people that step out of line too much.
Additionally, I reject the idea that a state's concerns over a defensive alliance justify invading its neighbors. As you rightly pointed out, Russia is an aggressive nation that wages war on its neighbors, like Georgia. In any case Russia has NATO at its borders right now and in this moment of great tension we have never used Finland to threaten Russia's security. It's also telling how Russia's neighboring countries beg the west to join NATO—not because of some imagined threat, but because they have genuine security concerns.
Obviously I like hearing your perspective though and on China I think you have a valid point.
I’m sure you understand the difference between explanation and justification. That Putin is a restrainer by Russian standards — if you think it’s just “posturing,” read the linked paper — tells us there was probably a perceived threat to Russian security and not just imperial machinations. Whether he’s a dictator is a non sequitur. It’s also not relevant whether NATO is actually a defensive alliance, just whether Russia sees it that way. After it promised not to expand “one inch eastward” past East Germany, but did anyway; bombed Serbia without UNSC authorization; exceeded its mandate and overthrew Gaddafi; and kept talking about “democracy promotion” (interpreted as regime change against non-democracies) and deploying more and more military assets to Eastern Europe, you might see why Moscow wouldn’t see it as so benign.
Using normative language like merit implies a level of justification rather than simply explaining the mental state of Russian leaders. That said, discussing the merits of Russia’s concerns is valid—there's no issue in doing so. We should do this.
Regarding the paper you linked, I don't disagree with its abstract that "Putin wins as much support when he is prudent and cooperative as when he is hostile and aggressive. These findings add to evidence that Russia's full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine was not a war of domestic political necessity." However, domestic popularity is only one factor in Putin’s decision-making. He likely believed the war would be easy peasy and a good strategic geopolitical move to strengthen Russia.
I mention Putin’s status as a dictator to remind readers that he "maintained his legitimacy" not just through public support but also by silencing and eliminating dissent. Any analysis of Putin’s legitimacy should acknowledge that in Russia, legitimacy is not freely expressed—it begins from a compromised position.
For explanatory purposes, I agree that whether NATO is actually a defensive alliance is not relevant (I acknowledge there is ambiguity). What matters is whether Russian leaders genuinely believe NATO poses a threat or if they merely use this narrative to justify their actions. After two years of Finland being a NATO member, there's little indication that we are actively threatening Russia from there. I doubt Putin perceives NATO as an imminent offensive threat to Russia to the extent that he claims.
From a normative standpoint, one should weigh what is best for the world and for Ukrainians: NATO expansion into Ukraine or Russian expansion into Ukraine. To me, the answer is quite one-sided.
Merit refers to the quality of the explanation, i.e., whether it's accurate. I think this should be obvious.
The question is: Does Russia have revisionist aims toward Eastern Europe, and specifically toward Poland? My position is that this is unclear or unlikely, and even if it does, it doesn't have the capabilities to act on them. It seems like the first part is the only point of disagreement.
Russia's regime type isn't relevant here. There are plenty of revisionist democracies (see: America, United States of) and relatively status quo autocracies (China). So the question becomes: Did Russia perceive NATO as a threat to its security?
I think it's fair to say so. They had plenty of reasons -- the U.S. going back on its word not to expand the alliance past East Germany, the illegal intervention in Kosovo, the overthrow of Gaddafi, military exercises along the border, refusing to close the door on Ukrainian NATO membership in late 2021. And Russia was seeking good relations with the West until around 2008, when NATO vowed that Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become members. The Finland example doesn't tell us anything because (1) Finland joined after the invasion of Ukraine, so it wouldn't have any bearing on why Russia invaded, and (2) what matters is Russia's perception, not reality.
"As for Iran, there is no Iranian nuclear weapons program today and there has not been one since 2003."
hmmm idk...Jeffrey Goldberg told me Tehran is two planck times away from developing a nuke
Noah Smith strikes me as someone who is very smart in one narrow domain (economics), and used that to win a big platform, which then pressured/allowed him to pontificate on other subjects on which he is considerably less insightful. Ruy Teixeira is the same way. I like them both but their foreign policy takes are almost always bad. One perk of legacy media is that it would have mostly kept them in their lane.
Exactly my impression too
Even if Japan, South Korea, and Poland did face a high risk of invasion by China/Russia, this wouldn't neccessarily justify nuclear proliferation right? We can think that yes, they face a risk, and yes, nukes would reduce it but that it still doesn't justify an increase in the risk of the use of nuclear weapons.
I'm curious whether this is your view Glenn, or whether you think whether it makes sense for these countries to acquire nukes is contingent on the risk of conventional war that they face? (If it's not contingent on this, why does the risk they face requite any discussion at all?)
There are probably some cases where proliferation is justified because it reduces long term nuclear risk. Probably it would have to be a state (A) with a nuclear armed adversary (B) where B is conventionally weaker and so would have to resort to a nuclear attack to destroy A. I suppose that would mean Japanese or Polish proliferation is bad in any scenario. But there might be a case for South Korea proliferating if North Korea (not China) became a lot more aggressive (or Iran vis a vis Israel for that matter).
Why Japan but not Taiwan? Why Poland but not Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania?
It seems like he’s picking nations that are sitting comfortably behind a couple of other US allies first on the chopping block if the “enemy” decides to invade.
Considering Russia has struggled for years invading a non-NATO nation with a GDP per capita less than $5,000, I don’t think anyone can claim Russia has the capability of invading NATO anytime soon. Their declining demographics (fewer military aged men) make this power imbalance even worse the longer they wait.
South Korea is the only nation here I could see as possibly being a candidate if you really stretch credulity. Obviously there would be many negative 2nd order effects from allowing them to acquire nuclear weapons, but their Northern nuclear neighbor definitely poses the most legitimate concern compared to the other nuclear candidates mentioned.
North Korea is constitutionally obligated to seek reunification, and their relative military strength vs. the South is likely to increase in the future. Uncertainty about US commitment to SK’s defense + rapidly declining military aged men (perhaps 1/3 as many in 2050) means the plausibility of invasion by the North will only go up over time. Maybe a nuclear armed South would serve to discourage this, and this might outweigh the other negatives.
I always find it amusing that so many hawks depict the "axis of autocracies" on a map with China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran highlighted then label Vietnam an emerging US ally even though its relations with China and Russia are closer than its relations with the US and its government is just as autocratic
All of this is simply a-historical: expansionism was the almost universal norm before the XXth century. Only democracy is naturally non expansionist, because fiscal resources come earmarked with electoral liabilities.
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/vjQ5BhKnDyY35dXXf/chomsky-vs-pax-democratica
If Trump invades Canadá is because he does not expect the Canadian to vote…
Nope! Democracies go to war just as often as non-democracies, they just don't go to war with each other (https://www.jstor.org/stable/26275240).
True! So, if you make everything a democracy you get the Kantian Perpetual Peace.
The only problem to the above argument is that from time to time, you can lose some democracies…
Nuclear weapons themselves are an asymmetric defense. The French and British stockpiles were meant as such if the Soviets invaded.
If Japan, SK, and Poland did acquire their own stockpiles, I doubt they would ever see significant use. Noah Smith imagines a fanciful ground war that won't occur in those countries. If China wants a war to dismantle the US led global order it will be in the form of a naval breakout where ICBMs will (hopefully) not see a significant role. Taiwan will either surrender from a blockade or not at all, there won't be any amphibious invasions. Russia will not be interested in invading Poland, but rather in forming a coalition of interested European nations to put financial pressure on them.
Couldn't agree more.
Regarding a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, I think you're right that it's unlikely, mostly because it would be really costly and painful for China and could threaten the CCP's legitimacy if it didn't go well. I think you risk employing the generalized anti-caution argument: https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/against-the-generalized-anti-caution