Ignoring Muslim Voters Could Cost Harris the Election

Harris's losses among Muslims are greater than the polling margins in several states.

Note: A while ago, I promised a few articles about insect welfare and Richard Hanania’s embrace of liberal internationalism. I never got around to writing those articles because I was distracted by fish and the election. Despite very failed Substacker

Amos Wollen

’s relentless harassment of me (see below), I still plan on responding to his insect article, probably sometime after Election Day.

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The Topline

• Muslim voters are uniquely motivated by the war in Gaza. They also vote in large enough numbers in swing states that they could tip a sufficiently close election.

• According to polling data, the number of Muslims who voted for Biden in 2020 but don’t plan to vote for Harris is greater than the historical or projected margin in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.

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I have been very critical of the Kamala Harris campaign, even though I think Harris would be a far better president than Donald Trump. Harris has failed to present a coherent alternative to Trump on the issues that voters say they care about most, and she’s never explained in sufficient depth what she plans to do if she’s elected president. She’s also alienated a small but potentially critical share of the Democratic activist class by running to the right of Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton on some economic issues (both Biden and Clinton supported the public option, while Harris doesn’t) and failing to engage progressives, Muslims, and Arabs who disagree with the administration’s position on the war in Gaza.

The campaign’s handling of Gaza has been embarrassingly bad since before Harris even clinched the nomination. As Shadi Hamid wrote for the Washington Post last week:

The problems [with Muslim voters] started during the Democratic National Convention in August. Democrats adopted a big tent approach, featuring a roster of Republican speakers on the main stage. But the tent was only so large. The Uncommitted movement had lobbied for a Palestinian American or a doctor who had volunteered in Gaza to address the convention. The final push was to have Georgia state Rep. Ruwa Romman speak. Her prepared remarks were fairly innocuous, expressing enthusiastic support for Harris while highlighting the need for a cease-fire and freeing Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners. Romman’s snub showed how sensitive the Harris campaign is to even mild expressions of support for the human rights of Palestinians.

By all accounts, the 2024 election is going to be very close. If the polls are accurate, it may again come down to a few thousands or tens of thousands of votes in a handful of states. When the margins are so close, any number of things will have been decisive to the outcome. If Harris loses, one of those things likely will have been her failure to appeal to Muslim voters. This is for three reasons:

• First, although the war in Gaza is politically contentious, there is a clear preference for restraint among voters who might be open to supporting Harris.

• Second, those who most strongly oppose U.S. aid to Israel, Muslim voters, are also uniquely motivated to support or oppose a candidate based on their policy toward Gaza.

• Third, Muslims vote in large enough numbers in key swing states that they would be in a position to decide the outcome of a sufficiently close election.

Based on current polling data and historical election results, Harris’s losses among Muslim voters relative to previous Democratic candidates may be large enough to cost her several states and throw the election to Trump.

1. Among voters who would be open to supporting Harris, there is a clear preference for restraint in Gaza.

• A June CBS News/YouGov poll found that 79% of self-identified Democrats and 66% of independents believe the Biden administration should encourage Israel to stop or lessen the war on Gaza, compared to 59% of the public at large. Sixty-one of respondents believe the United States should not send weapons or supplies to Israel, including 77% of Democrats and 62% of independents.

• A September Economist/YouGov poll found that 52% of Democrats and 40% of independents support decreasing U.S. aid to Israel, compared to only 10% and 11%, respectively, who support increasing aid. Fifty-nine percent of Democrats and 36% of independents agree that Israel committing genocide, compared to 15% and 27% who disagree.

• A September Arab American Institute/Zogby poll found that 34% of independents and overall voters say they would be more likely to vote for Harris if she supported an arms embargo against Israel, compared to 20% who say they would be less likely to vote for Harris.

Source: Arab American Institute.

2. Opponents of the war care more about Harris’s Israel policy than supporters.

• A September poll of Jewish voters conducted by the Jewish Democratic Council of America found that only 9% consider Israel one of the most important issues in the election, with 15% each identifying antisemitism and foreign policy as top priorities. The number who prioritize these issues and would also be open to supporting Harris is likely significantly lower, as the above figures include Orthodox Jews who are disproportionately motivated by antisemitism and Middle East policy and overwhelming support Trump.

• According to the same poll, 64% of Jewish voters say the administration’s policy toward Israel makes them either less likely to support Harris or has no impact on their vote, compared to 36% who say the administration’s policy makes them more likely to support Harris. An equal percentage of Jewish voters say they strongly support and strongly oppose the administration’s policy.

Source: Jewish Dems Polling.

• A June and July poll of Muslim voters in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Georgia found that 61% consider the war in Gaza one of the most important issues in the election, including 71% of those who plan to vote for a third party or write-in candidate. Another 22% identify “keeping the United States out of foreign wars” as a top priority, including 24% of third party and write-in voters. Of those who supported Biden in 2020 but didn’t support Biden or Harris in 2024, 67% said the war in Gaza is a top priority.

• In the same poll, 91% of Muslim third party and write-in voters say they would be more likely to support a candidate who calls for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza. Eighty-eight percent say they would be more likely to support a candidate who backs a reduction in military aid to Israel. More than 70% of Muslim Trump supporters also agree with these statements.

Source: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.

3. Muslim voters are a large enough bloc to be decisive in some states.

• In 2016, Trump’s margin of victory was 77,744 votes in the key states. In 2020, Biden’s margin of victory was 42,918 votes.

• According to the Muslim American civic organization Emgage, the combined number of Muslim voters in twelve key states in 2020 was more than one million. In Georgia, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania alone, the combined number of Muslim voters exceeded Biden’s margin of victory by almost 90,000. If Biden had not won those three states, he would have lost the election.

• In recent elections, Muslims have voted overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates. In 2016, 74% of Muslims cast a ballot for Hillary Clinton, compared to 13% for Trump. In 2020, an Associated Press exit poll found that 64% of Muslim voters cast a ballot for Biden and 35% for Trump. An exit poll by the Council on American-Islamic Relations found that 69% voted for Biden, 17% for Trump, and 3% for a third party. The American National Election Study reports that 83% of Muslims voted for Biden and 17% for Trump.

• Harris is lagging far behind historical Democratic performance with Muslim voters. In late August, a CAIR poll in six swing states showed Harris with just 29.4% support among Muslim voters, compared to 29.1% for Green Party candidate Jill Stein, 11% for Trump, and 4% for independent candidate Cornel West. Here is the breakdown by state:

Source: Council on American-Islamic Relations.

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What’s the damage?

In the table below, I estimate the size of Harris’s loss with Muslim voters relative to Biden’s performance in six swing states. I then compare Harris’s loss to the margin by which those states were decided in 2016 and 2020, as well as the projected margin in 2024 based on Nate Silver, RealClearPolitics, and 538’s polling averages. If a cell is shaded green, it indicates that Harris’s loss with Muslims is less than the corresponding historical or projected margin in that state. If a cell is shaded red, Harris’s loss is greater than the margin.

A few notes on methodology:

• Emgage does not track Muslim voter turnout in Arizona. I assume that Arizona has as many Muslim voters as North Carolina, which had a similar sized Muslim population and similar overall voter turnout in 2020.

• In North Carolina, where CAIR did not field the survey, I assume that Harris has the same level of support as her average support from Muslim voters across the other swing states.

• The first set of calculations uses the AP 2020 exit poll as a baseline for Biden’s support from Muslim voters. The second set uses the CAIR exit poll, and the third set uses the American National Election Study.

In the best-case scenario for Harris, Democrats have lost more than half their support from Muslim voters. This is more than seven times the margin by which Michigan was decided in 2016 and greater than the margins in Arizona and Georgia in 2020. Even without accounting for non-Muslim progressives who oppose the war in Gaza, Harris can expect to lose 1.37% of the vote in Michigan—greater than the margin predicted by any of the major polling aggregators—0.49% in Pennsylvania, 0.40% in Arizona, 0.26% in Georgia, 0.25% in North Carolina, and 0.11% in Wisconsin.

In the worst-case scenario, Democrats have lost nearly two-thirds of their support from Muslim voters. This is nearly ten times the margin by which Michigan was decided in 2016, greater than the margin in Pennsylvania in 2016, and more than twice the margin in Arizona and Georgia in 2020. If Harris were to win every swing state except those four, she would lose the election. She can expect to lose 1.87% of the vote in Michigan and 0.83% in Pennsylvania—greater than the margin predicted by any of the major polling aggregators—0.62% in Arizona, 0.49% in Georgia, 0.38% in North Carolina, and 0.20% in Wisconsin.

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